Heuristic Voting as Ordinal Dominance Strategies by Lev, Omer et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
05
52
9v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
3 N
ov
 20
18
Heuristic Voting as Ordinal Dominance Strategies
Omer Lev1 and Reshef Meir2 and Svetlana Obraztsova3 and Maria Polukarov4
1 Ben-Gurion University omerlev@bgu.ac.il
2 Technion-Israel Institute of Technology reshefm@ie.technion.ac.il
3 Nanyang Technological University lana@ntu.edu.sg
4 King’s College London maria.polukarov@kcl.ac.uk
Abstract
Decision making under uncertainty is a key component of
many AI settings, and in particular of voting scenarios where
strategic agents are trying to reach a joint decision. The com-
mon approach to handle uncertainty is by maximizing ex-
pected utility, which requires a cardinal utility function as
well as detailed probabilistic information. However, often
such probabilities are not easy to estimate or apply.
To this end, we present a framework that allows “shades of
gray” of likelihood without probabilities. Specifically, we cre-
ate a hierarchy of sets of world states based on a prospec-
tive poll, with inner sets contain more likely outcomes.
This hierarchy of likelihoods allows us to define what we
term ordinally-dominated strategies. We use this approach to
justify various known voting heuristics as bounded-rational
strategies.
Introduction
The question of how agents – human or artificial – choose a
strategy when facing a choice, has been at the center of atten-
tion in artificial intelligence since its inception. Approaches
to decision making often rely on two primary components:
the epistemic state of the agent (her beliefs on how her ac-
tions will affect the world), and her innate preferences (the
utility or cost associated with each outcome).
In voting scenarios, agents’ actions are aggregated to
reach a shared result. Voters can make strategic choices once
they know what the state of the world is (what other agents
are voting), following their own utility function (in most vot-
ing settings, an ordinal preference over possible outcomes is
assumed). This voting decision may either be applied once
based on the current beliefs of the voters, or in an iterative
fashion so that voters have several opportunities to observe
the world and change their action. When the votes of oth-
ers are unknown, the epistemic state might depend on some
prior knowledge and/or signals from the environment.
The most common way to address this lack of knowl-
edge is to assign probabilities to each state of the world
and assume that agents each maximize their expected util-
ity over all possible states (see Related Work). However, in
many situations human agents may not have the ability to
determine precise probabilities of each state of the world,
or to act according to them (Tversky and Kahneman 1974;
Chater, Tenenbaum, and Yuille 2006). There is no reason to
believe that in voting scenarios people will perform differ-
ently in this respect.
Voting without Probabilities Alternative approaches,
focusing on decision making in face of strict uncertainty
(defined in terms of possible or impossible states) have
been formulated and applied in various AI and eco-
nomic settings (Dow and Werlang 1994; Boutilier 1994;
Halpern 1997; Matt, Toni, and Vaccari 2009),
and more recently, in the context of
voting (Conitzer, Walsh, and Xia 2011;
Reijngoud and Endriss 2012;
Meir, Lev, and Rosenschein 2014). The idea at the core of
this approach is that, for any given voter, a vote a′ locally
dominates another vote a if a′ is at least as good as a for this
voter in any voting profile that she considers to be possible.
In fact, voting behavior can also be defined without any
explicit epistemic model. Indeed, several recent papers sug-
gest various heuristics that are specific to a voting rule and/or
context. Some of these heuristics have been shown to be
empirically consistent with voters’ behavior in lab experi-
ments (Laslier 2010), and others guarantee desirable conver-
gence and/or welfare properties when applied by all voters
in a group (Grandi et al. 2013).
Contribution We extend the framework suggested in the
strict uncertainty papers mentioned above, by allowing
gradual levels of uncertainty. Specifically, we build on the
idea of having a likelihood hierarchy – a sequence of sets of
states of the world, where each next set is a superset of the
previous set in the sequence, so that the states in inner sets
are considered by the voter to be more likely. An undomi-
nated vote in this setting is one which is not dominated at
any level of the hierarchy.
Using this hierarchy of likelihood, we suggest an alterna-
tive representation for information structures in voting.
We show how the relevant information can be boiled down
to what we call a pivot-graph, which succinctly captures all
situations where the voter may be pivotal. We then show that
the information structure allows us to justify several exist-
ing voting heuristics as rational decisions for an appropri-
ate epistemic model (a specific hierarchy of pivot-graphs).
This observation enables us to generalize existing conver-
gence results in the literature on iterative voting, by showing
how convergence follows from topological properties of the
pivot-graphs.
Related Work For an up-to-date coverage of itera-
tive voting, heuristics and uncertainty-based models, see
(Meir 2017). In particular, Conitzer et al. (2011) consider a
voter facing an arbitrary information set, and Reijngoud and
Endriss (2012) study partial information settings where, for
example, only the candidates’ scores or only the identity of
the leader are known. Closest to our paper is the local dom-
inance model (Meir, Lev, and Rosenschein 2014), in which
all voters base their belief on a shared prospective state. It’s
been shown that in an iterative voting setting where voters
play possible actions that dominate their current action, they
are guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium under certain
assumptions on the distance metric.
Voting heuristics do not explicitly define voters’ beliefs;
instead, they specify a (typically) simple function that
dictates a vote in every given state, aiming to capture re-
alistic voting behaviors (Reijngoud and Endriss 2012;
Grandi et al. 2013). In particular, some mod-
els suggest that a non-pivotal voter either
votes truthfully (Dutta and Laslier 2010) or ab-
stains (Desmedt and Elkind 2010).
These models stand in contrast with the expected util-
ity models, such as, for example, the calculus of vot-
ing (Myerson and Weber 1993) for a large number of vot-
ers, where a voter computes the probability for each action
(vote) to be pivotal in every pairwise tie. We see our model
as a way to capture a similar line of reasoning in identifying
the influential ties, albeit without using probabilities. Amore
fundamental difference with the calculus of voting approach
is that the latter assumes a common knowledge of rationality
and the preference distribution, from which an equilibrium
is derived.
There are also other non-probabilistic models of un-
certainty, where two of the most prominent ones are
the possibility theory (Dubois, Fargier, and Prade 1996) and
Dempster-Shafer theory (Shafer 1976). These models at-
tribute a cardinal possibility measure to states and de-
velop calculus rules for belief updates and comparisons.
The closest to our work is the plausibility measure ap-
proach (Halpern 1997), that allows for a partial order of
plausibility. Our hierarchical ordinal dominance concept is
even more strict, and relies on the structure of the problem
where uncertainty is essentially about the accuracy of a sin-
gle point estimate (a poll).
While we take our distance-based epistemic assumptions
from the aforementioned local dominance voting model, an
earlier precursor of this idea is the logic for inexact knowl-
edge based on margin-of-error (Williamson 1992).
Model
An election is composed of a set V of n voters and a set C
of m candidates. Each voter i ∈ V has a weak preference
relation %i⊆ C × C over the candidates, that is, for each
two candidates x, y ∈ C, x %i y or y %i x, and if both are
true, they are equivalent. Moreover, the relation is transitive
(so, for x, y, z,∈ C, x %i y and y %i z, then x %i z).
The voting rules we shall focus on are the score-based
voting (SBV) rules. An SBV (fˆ , A) is defined by a set
A ⊆ Nm of allowed votes, and a function fˆ : An → C.
For example, the set A under Plurality contains all vectors
which have only one non-zero element, which is 1; Approval
allows all binary vectors; Borda allows all permutations of
(0, . . . ,m − 1); etc. We denote by a = (ai)i∈V the vot-
ing profile; by ai(c) ∈ N the absolute score given to c by
agent i in vote ai ∈ A; and by sa(c) =
∑
i∈V ai(c) the total
score given to candidate c. This creates an aggregated score
vector s of size m, in which each coordinate corresponds to
a different candidate, and its value is sa(c). The winner is
fˆ(s) = argmaxc∈C s(c), breaking ties lexicographically.
For each voter i, the outcome (and thus, her utility) de-
pends on her own vote, as well as on the state of the world
s = sa−i , that encompasses the votes of all other partici-
pants. We separate these two arguments by writing the out-
come function as f(s, ai) = fˆ(s+ai). For every state s and
any two actions ai, bi ∈ A, we write f(s, ai) ≻i f(s, bi)
when voter i prefers action ai over bi at state s.
Example 1. There are 100 voters and 5 candidates –
w, b, c, d, e – using the Plurality voting system. The voters
have access to a poll where votes are s = (29, 26, 22, 17, 6).
A voter i currently voting for b sees the state s = sa−i =
(29,25, 22, 17, 6). For any action a′i of i, f(s, a
′
i) = w,
which means that voter i is indifferent between her actions.
Note that the voters never explicitly reason about the pref-
erences of other individuals – only about their (aggregated)
actions. We will return to this example later in the paper.
Information structures
An information set is a set of states S′ ⊆ S. An informa-
tion structure of agent i is a collection of information sets
Si = (Sij)
k
j=1, where S
i
j ⊆ S
i
j+1 for all j. That is, each
information set contains the sets with a lower index.
An agent does not assign probabilities to states or to in-
formation sets, but an intuitive interpretation of the model is
that agent i believes any state in Sij to be substantially more
likely than all states outsideSij . An information structure can
either be shared by all agents, or be agent-specific.
Example 2. Consider voter i from Example 1 and assume
she has an information structure Si = (Si1, S
i
2) as in Fig-
ure 1. In particular, i believes that candidate c may win (as,
e.g., s′ = (24, 21, 26, 17, 6) ∈ Si2); however, this is far less
likely than a victory of w or b, as there is no state s′′ ∈ Si1
where c wins.
Ordinal dominance
Following (Conitzer, Walsh, and Xia 2011;
Reijngoud and Endriss 2012;
Meir, Lev, and Rosenschein 2014), for any information
set Sij and actions a, b ∈ A, we say that action a S
i
j-
dominates action b (denoted a ≻ij b) if f(s, a) %
i f(s, b)
for all s ∈ Sij and f(s, a) ≻
i f(s, b) for at least one s ∈ Sij .
Agent i is indifferent between actions a, b at Sij (denoted
a ∼ij b) if f(s, a) ∼
i f(s, b) for all s ∈ Sij . Note that
w b c d e
−10
−20
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Figure 1: Information structure of voter i at state sa−i =
(29,25, 22, 17, 6) (gray pillars). The set Si1 contains all
states that result from changing the score of any candidate
in sa−i by at most 3 votes (solid arrows). The set S
i
2 allows
for a variation of 5 votes (dashed arrows). The dotted lines
indicate the state s′ from Example 2.
Sij-dominance is a partial order over actions A (transitive,
antisymmetric and irreflexive relation).
Definition 1. Action a ordinally dominates action b (in
structure Si = (Sij)j∈[k]) if there is some j ∈ [k] such that
action a Sij-dominates action b.
The next lemma guarantees that it is not possible that
a ≻j b and b ≻j′ a for some j′ 6= j.
Lemma 3. Ordinal dominance is a partial order.
Proof. Transitivity: Suppose action a ordinally dominates
action b and b ordinally dominates action c, due to Sij and
Sij′ , respectively. W.l.o.g. j
′ ≤ j, then Sij′ ⊆ S
i
j . There
is a state s′ ∈ Sij′ where f(s
′, b) ≻i f(s′, c), and since
s′ ∈ Sij′ ⊆ S
i
j , we also have f(s
′, a) i f(s′, b), and so
f(s′, a) ≻i f(s′, c). Similarly, for any s ∈ Sij′ , f(s, a) 
i
f(s, b) i f(s, c). Thus a ≻ij′ c which means that a ordi-
nally dominates c.
Antisymmetry: Suppose action a ordinally dominates ac-
tion b due to Sij . For every j
′ ≤ j, there cannot be a
state s ∈ Sij′ ⊆ S
i
j where f(s, b) ≻
i f(s, a). Similarly,
for any j′ > j, there is a state s′ ∈ Sij ⊆ S
i
j′ where
f(s′, b) ≺i f(s′, a). Thus, b does notSij′ -dominates a. Since
this is true for any j′, b does not ordinally dominate a.
Distance-based uncertainty
Following Meir et al. (2014), we consider the following way
to derive information sets and information structures. Given
a metric d : S × S → [0, 1] and a parameter r ∈ [0, 1],
every state s ∈ S explicitly defines an information set
Sd,r(s) = {s
′ : d(s, s′) ≤ r}. In general, the metric d can
be completely arbitrary and the induced set is meaningless.1
However, in the context of voting there are several natural
metrics: For example, d(s, s′) may reflect what fraction of
votes has changed between s and s′. In Meir et al. (2014)
and Meir (2015), the distances between candidate score vec-
tors were defined by different ℓ-norms and the Earth Mover
1In fact, any set S′ ⊆ S can be derived from s for some care-
fully designed metric d.
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Figure 2: A schematic example of the information struc-
ture SEMD,r(s), and the induced pivot graph structure
HEMD,r(s). E.g., graphH4 contains the edge (b, d) due to
state s′ ∈ S4. States belowS4 are considered impossible. All
the pivot graphs are upward closed w.r.t. the lexicographic
order on C, but they are not always a clique ((d, e) /∈ H4).
distance (EMD), which is essentially the ℓ1 norm with the
additional constraint that the total number of votes remains
the same. Thus, Sd,r(s) may reflect a range of possible can-
didates’ scores given a poll or a current state s.
Pivot graphs
A pair of actions (a′, a′′) is pivotal for a pair of candidates
c′, c′′ ∈ C in state s ∈ S, if f(s, a′) = c′ and f(s, a′′) = c′′.
An agent i is pivotal for the pair of candidates c′, c′′ ∈ C in
information set Sij , if there are s ∈ S
i
j and actions a
′
i, a
′′
i ∈
A that are pivotal for c′, c′′ in s.
Information set Sij then induces a pivot-graph H
i
j =
(C,E), which contains a vertex for every candidate, and an
edge (c′, c′′) if agent i is pivotal for the pair c′, c′′ in Sij .
Every information structure Si induces a pivot graph
structure Hi = (Hij)
k
j=1, where each H
i
j is a subgraph of
Hij+1 (since adding more states can only add edges to the
graph). The set H (C) contains all pivot graph structures.
Epistemic models and OD Equilibrium
An epistemic model of agent i maps any state s to an in-
formation structure Si(s) = (Si1(s), S
i
2(s), . . . , S
i
k(s)), and
thus also to a pivot graph structureHi(s).
We define the set OD%i(S, a) that contains all actions
that ordinally dominate a in S according to preferences %i,
and a set UOD(S, a) containing all actions a′ that ordinally
dominate a but are not ordinally dominated themselves. Nat-
urally, this leads to a definition of an OD-equilibrium– when
for every agent OD%i(S
i(sa−i), ai) is empty (and hence,
UOD%i(S
i(sa−i), ai) = ∅ too).
Observation 4. For a “full information” epistemic model
where Si(s) = ({s}), the set OD(Si(s), ai) coin-
cides with the set of better-responses to (s, ai); the set
UOD(Si(s), ai) coincides with best-responses; and OD
equilibrium coincides with a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
An epistemic model is cliqued if its mapping to a pivot
graph structure H(s) at every state s ∈ S, Hj(s), is a
clique. The epistemic model is upward closed if the pivot
graph structure H(s) at every state s has an order L over
candidates such that if (c, c′) ∈ Hj(s) and c′′ >L c′ then
(c, c′′) ∈ Hj(s). Note that any cliqued epistemic model is
upward closed (where L may be an arbitrary order where all
candidates in Hj(s) precede all others). More generally, L
can be roughly thought of as an order of likelihood of states.
For simplicity of notation, we denote both the pivot graph
structure and the epistemic model (which is a function from
states to structures) byH.
Distance metrics provide us with a simple way to define
an information structure: given a metric d and an increasing
sequence of distances r = (r1, r2, . . . , rk), we get an epis-
temic modelHd,r(s) = (Hd,r1(s), Hd,r2(s), . . . , Hd,rk(s))
that is induced by Sd,r(s). We later show how the topologi-
cal properties of Hd,r(s) are related to the properties of the
metric d.
Example 5. We expand Example 1 where candidates’ scores
(in % of total) are (29, 26, 22, 17, 6). We do not specify the
number of voters in the poll. We consider a voter with a
concentric information structure, based on the radii r =
{1%, 3%, 7%, 17%} and the EMD metric. These informa-
tion sets induce pivot-graphs as illustrated in Figure 2.
In Example 5, consider a Plurality voter whose prefer-
ences are e ≻ d ≻ c ≻ b ≻ w. Then the action “c” (a
shorthand for (0, 0, 1, 0, 0)) ordinally dominates action “e”
(due toH3) and “b” ordinally dominates everything else due
toH2.
Sharp Pivot Property in large populations
Note that structures Si andHi are two different ways to rep-
resent the information of an agent. In general, Hi contains
less information than Si, since there may be states when
some action pairs are pivotal, whereas others are not.
Yet, it seems plausible that in a large population, a voter
is unlikely to make such fine distinctions about the possi-
ble outcomes: voters do not know the exact score of each
candidate, but only have a rough idea of what it is (each can-
didate’s share of the votes). As a result, it is reasonable to
assume that if a voter considers herself pivotal in some pos-
sible tie, she will consider any change in her vote as possi-
bly pivotal. We capture this property in the following formal
definition.
Definition 2 (Sharp Pivot Property (SPP)). An information
structure Si satisfies the Sharp Pivot Property if: for all j
and all c′, c′′ ∈ C, an edge (c′, c′′) ∈ Hij entails that any
pair of actions (a′i, a
′′
i ) such that a
′
i(c
′)−a′i(c
′′) > a′′i (c
′)−
a′′i (c
′′) is pivotal for (c′, c′′) in Sij .
That is, if there is some action pair that makes c′ the win-
ner instead of c′′, then any move that increases the gap in
favor of c′ might make c′ beat c′′ and become the winner (in
some s ∈ Sij).
Working with pivot-graph structures is much more con-
venient than working with arbitrary information sets, and
their meaning in the context of voting is clear. We will as-
sume throughout the paper that all information structures
have SPP, which means that Hi contains all the relevant in-
formation in Si.
Justifying SPP While SPP is plausible, we would like to
show that at least in some cases it provably holds. The argu-
ment is a rather fine one, that relies on viewing the (finite)
poll as approximating some underlying real-valued distribu-
tion p ∈ ∆(C). Distribution p defines a unique score vector
snp for every population size n (using some fixed rounding
of p ·n), and we argue that for a sufficiently large population
n, the information structure Sd,r(snp ) satisfies SPP.
Intuitively, consider the leader w in Example 5 with the
Plurality rule, some other candidate (say b), and some in-
formation set Sd,rj(s). If s(w) − s(b) is much lower than
rj · n, then any move where the voter deserts w and/or joins
b might be pivotal for (b, w). In contrast, if s(w) − s(b) is
much higher than rj ·n, then b can never win or even tie with
w. Only if s(w) − s(b) ∼= rj · n, then moving from w to b
makes b the winner, but (say) moving from d to b does not.
This extreme case becomes unlikely as the population gets
larger.
Theorem 6. For the EMD metric d, any SBV, and any radii
vector r, the following holds for almost all2 distributions
p ∈ ∆(C): There is n0 such that for all n > n0, the infor-
mation structure Sd,r(snp ) satisfies SPP.
Computing dominance relations
We show that strategies can be efficiently compared accord-
ing to ordinal dominance.
Proposition 7. Given a pivot graph structure Hi =
(Hi1, . . . , H
i
k) and any SBV (fˆ , A), voter i can check in time
O(m2k) if vote a′i ∈ A ordinally dominates vote ai ∈ A.
Intuitively, Algorithm 1 checks (for each uncertainty level
j), whether the new vote a′i is “safe” (not worse than ai in
any possible tie), and whether it is “pivotal” (better than ai
in at least one tie).
I[X ] ∈ {−1, 1} is an indicator variable for statement X ,
and we use ai(c) to indicate candidate c’s score when voter i
vote is ai. The complexity of checking whether a given vote
ai is undominated is left as an open question.
Algorithm 1: OD(a′i, ai ∈ A,%
i,Hi ∈ H )
for c, c′ ∈ C do
diff(c, c′)← a′i(c) + ai(c
′)− ai(c)− a
′
i(c
′);
effect(c, c′)← sign(diff(c, c′) · I [c ≻i c′]);
for j ≤ k do
safe(j)← min(c,c′)∈Hi
j
effect(c, c′);
pivot(j)← max(c,c′)∈Hi
j
effect(c, c′);
dom(j)← I [pivot(j) + safe(j) ≥ 1];
if ∃j ≤ k s.t. dom(j) = 1 then
return TRUE
else
return FALSE
2Except a 0-measure set of distributions.
Proof. Suppose a′ ordinally dominates a. Then there is
some level j ≤ k such that a′ ≻ij a. This means that for
any pair of candidates (c, c′) that can be tied in Hij , either
c is preferred to c′ and a′ weakly reduced c′’s score, or
c′ is preferred to c and a′ weakly adds to c′’s score (thus
effect(c, c′) ≥ 0). Hence, in particular safe(j) ≥ 0. In
addition, there must be a pair for which the gain is strict,
and effect(c, c′) = 1, which means pivot(j) = 1. In total,
dom(j) ≥ 1 + 0 = 1 so the algorithm returns TRUE.
Otherwise, in every level j, either a′i, ai have the same
outcome in all states, or there is a pair (c, c′) ∈ Hij such that
f(s, ai) = c, f(s, a
′
i) = c
′, and c ≻i c′.
In the latter case, since f is a scoring rule this means
that a′i(c) − ai(c) < a
′
i(c
′) − ai(c′), i.e. that c′ gained
strictly more score than c when changing from ai to a
′
i.
Thus diff(c, c′) = a′i(c) + ai(c
′) − ai(c) − a′i(c
′) < 0, and
effect(c, c′) = −1. The algorithm then computes safe(j) =
−1. Therefore dom(j) ≤ 1− 1 = 0.
In the first case, effect(c, c′) = 0 for all pairs, and thus
safe(j) = pivot(j) = 0, and dom(j) = 0.
Justifying Voting Heuristics with OD
Many heuristics have been suggested to analyze how voters
behave and change their vote. Most heuristics are derived
from a single “prospective state” s, which is assumed to be
the current voting profile or poll. Formally, a set heuristics is
a function h : S × A → 2A that maps the prospective state
and the current action to a set of new possible actions. We
say that h is a point heuristics if |h(s, a)| ≤ 1 for every s, a.
To be consistent with previous definitions, we always omit a
from the set h(s, a), and assume that when h(s, a) = ∅ the
voter simply keeps her current vote.
Definition 3. We say that an epistemic model H justifies
heuristic h, if for any state s ∈ S and current action a ∈ A:
(I) h(s, a) = ∅ if and only if UOD(S(s), a) = ∅; and (II)
h(s, a) ⊆ UOD(S(s), a).H strongly justifies h if (II) holds
with equality.
This means that the heuristic h only recommends undom-
inated ordinal-dominance moves under the epistemic model
H, and only keeps the current action if no such move exists.
As a simple example, consider the Plurality rule and the
heuristic hnot−last(s, a) that is empty except when action
a is the least preferred candidate aˆi, and then it moves to
an arbitrary other candidate. Consider the epistemic model
Hall(s) = (Hall1 ) whereH
all
1 is the complete graph.
Observation 8. Hall strongly justifies hnot−last.
This is since (I) suppose that a 6= aˆi. Then no candidate
ordinally dominates a and thus UOD(Hall(s), a) = ∅ =
hnot−last(s, a); (II) when a = aˆi, any other candidate c is
undominated but globally dominates a (since there is a pos-
sible state where i is pivotal for c against a), in which case
UOD(Hall(s), a) = C \ {aˆi} = hnot−last(s, a).
Local dominance
Local dominance (Meir, Lev, and Rosenschein 2014)
heuristic with metric d and parameter r explicitly define
a set Sd,r(s) = {s′ : d(s, s′) ≤ r}. The heuristic action
hLDd,r (s, ai) is defined for the Plurality rule as follows: Let
D ⊆ C be the set of candidates that Sd,r(s)-dominate ai; If
D is non-empty, then vote for the most preferred candidate
inD.
We define an epistemic model HLDd,r where H
LD(s)d,r
contains a single pivot graph H1 which is the pivot graph
induced by Sd,r(s). Note that our definition applies for any
voting rule, unlike the one in Meir et al. (2014). In Plural-
ity, HLDd,r justifies h
LD
d,r (straightforward proof omitted due
to space constraints).
Truth/lazy-bias Denote the top candidate of i by qi ∈ C,
and denote by ⊥ an “abstain” action that adds no score to
candidates. We adopt the suggested variations in Dutta and
Laslier (2010) and Desmedt and Elkind (2010), where the
voter prefers the truthful/abstain action if this does no af-
fect the outcome. However, this naı¨ve modification alone
may lead to unreasonable behaviors, e.g., where no-one
votes (Elkind et al. 2015), even under full information.3
For r2 > r1, the “truth bias” heuristics h
LD+TB
d,r1,r2
(s, ai) is
as follows (Meir, Lev, and Rosenschein 2014): (1) perform
a local-dominance move at radius r1, if exists. If such move
does not exist, i examines if f(s′, ai) ≻i f(s′, qi) for some
s′ ∈ Sd,r2(s). (2a) If so, agent i keeps the current vote ai,
(2b) otherwise, i moves to qi.
While the behavior seems to maintain the reason behind
truth bias, the definition of h is cumbersome. Instead, we
can use r1, r2 to define an epistemic modelH
LD+TB
d,r1,r2
as fol-
lows. We letH1(s) be as inH
LD
d,r1
above. We similarly com-
pute H2(s) from Sd,r2(s), but taking only edges between
the current vote ai and candidates less preferred than ai. Let
H = HLD+TBd,r1,r2 (s) = (H1(s), H1(s) ∪H2(s)).
Proposition 9. HLD+TBd,r1,r2 justifies h
LD+TB
d,r1,r2
in Plurality.
Proof. First, if H1(s) is nonempty (at least one tie) then
hLD+TBd,r1,r2 (s, ai) = a
∗
i ∈ UOD(H(s), ai) as in a standard
LD move. Otherwise, there are two cases.
If H2(s) contains some edge (ai, b), then by SPP for any
a′ 6= ai there is a state s′ ∈ Sd,r2(s) where f(s
′, ai) = ai
and f(s′, a′) = b (think of s′ as state where a single addi-
tional vote for ai is critical). Since ai is preferred to b by
the definition of H2(s), we conclude that no candidate a
′
dominates ai inH2(s) (thus UOD(H(s), ai) = ∅); and that
f(s′, ai) = ai ≻i b = f(s′, qi) (thus h
LD+TB
d,r1,r2
(s, ai) = ∅).
In the second case, there is no such edge, then H2(s)
is empty. This means that no action of i can change
the outcome whatsoever, and thus by the slight truth-
bias qi is strictly preferred to any other action. In par-
ticular, it ordinally dominates ai and is undominated so
UOD(H(s), ai) = {qi}. Finally, since i is non-pivotal
then in particular there is no state s′ ∈ Sd,r2(s) such
that f(s′, ai) ≻
i f(s′, qi). Thus h
LD+TB
d,r1,r2
(s, ai) = qi ∈
UOD(H(s), ai), as required.
3To be completely formal, the preference relation %i has to be
extended to preferences over pairs (winner,action). See supplemen-
tary material for details.
The statement for lazy-bias is similar, and uses the same
information structure but with a slight preference to abstain
instead of voting truthfully.
T -pragmatist
The T -pragmatist (point) heuristic
(Brams and Fishburn 1978; Reijngoud and Endriss 2012)
considers the leading T candidates in s (denoted T),
and sets a new action a′i = h
T−prag(s, ai) where a
′
i
is identical to ai except the favorite candidate in T is
given maximal score (in any SBV). E.g., in Example 1,
if e ≻i c ≻i b ≻i w ≻i d, then h2−prag(s, ai) = b and
h3−prag(s, ai)=h
4−prag(s, ai)=c.
Consider a single-level epistemic model i HT,i−star(s),
which contains a star graph, in which the center node is the
most preferred candidate by voter i in the top T candidates,
and it is tied with all other T − 1 candidates in the top T .
It is possible to show that (I) hT−prag(s, ai) = ∅ ⇐⇒
OD(HT,i−star(s), ai) = ∅; and (II) h
T−prag(s, ai) ⊆
OD(HT,i−star(s), ai). This shows a connection between
the heuristic and the epistemic model, but it is not a suffi-
cient justification since hT−prag(s, ai) may be dominated.
A closer look reveals that the actions dominating it are quite
plausible: ranking the other candidates in T at the bottom
can only benefit the voter!We conclude that the T-pragmatist
heuristic could be improved.
We define the hT∗ heuristic similarly to hT−prag , with the
following difference: all other candidates in T get minimal
score (i.e., ranked at the bottom of a′i) while maintaining the
same order among themselves as in ai.
Proposition 10. HT,i−star strongly justifies hT∗ in any
SBV.
The proof is given in the supplementary material.
Leader Rule (Approval voting)
Assume candidates c1, . . . , cm are sorted in decreasing score
order in a state s. In Approval voting the allowed actions are
A = 2C . The Leader rule (Laslier 2009) a′ = hLR(s, ai) is
a strategy approving all candidates strictly preferred to the
leader of s, and approves the leader of s (candidate c1) if
and only if it is preferred to the runner-up c2 (i.e., exactly
one of c1, c2 is being approved in a
′).
We consider the epistemic model whereHLR(s) consists
of two nested pivot graphs. The inner graph H1 contains a
single edge between c1 and c2. The outer graphH2 is a star
connecting c1 to all candidates.
Proposition 11. a′ = hLR(s, ai) ordinally dominates
all other actions according to HLR. In particular, HLR
strongly justifies hLR.
Proof. Let a′′ be any alternative vote to a′. We will show
that a′ dominates a′′ in at least one of the tie graphs H1 or
H2.
Consider a′′ that differs from a′ on (at least) c1 or c2 or
both. On the graphH1, the voter is pivotal for c1, c2 and thus
there is a state s where f(s, a′′) = c2 ≺i c1 = f(s, a′), or
f(s, a′′) = c1 ≺i c2 = f(s, a′). Thus a′ dominates a′′ on
H1.
Next, consider a′′ that approves c1, c2 iff a
′ approves
them, but differs in (at least) some other candidate c′. If
c1 ≻ c′, c′ is not approved in a′ and thus approved in a′′
(this is regardless of whether c1 is approved). Since there is
a state s in H2 where c1 and c
′ are tied, f(s, a′′) = c′ ≺
c1 = f(s, a
′). If c1 ≺ c′, c′ is approved in a′ but not
in a′′. Again, since there is a state s where they are tied,
f(s, a′) = c′ ≺ c1 = f(s, a′′). Thus a′ ≻i2 a
′′ and therefore
a′ ordinally dominates a′′.
OD and Iterative Voting
Since ordinal-dominance induces a natural concept of OD-
response, we are interested in its implications on iterative
voting with multiple strategic voters. In iterative voting, vot-
ers proceed from some initial state s0, and in each iteration
an arbitrary voter changes her votes, a process that may ei-
ther converge to an equilibrium or reach a cycle. Our con-
vergence results depend on the structure of the pivot graphs
in the epistemic model.
We first show that both cliqued and upward-closed epis-
temic structures are the result distance-based uncertainty
with natural assumptions on the distance function.
Proposition 12. 1. Any neutral distance metric d on scoring
vectors induces an upward-closed epistemic model.
2. Any candidate-wise distance metric4 d on scoring vectors
induces a cliqued epistemic model.
Proof of 1. Assume for contradiction that there is a state s
in which there are c1, c2, c3 ∈ C such that s(c1) ≥ s(c2) ≥
s(c3), c2, c3 are tied in a state s
′ within a distance r from s,
but c1, c3 are not tied within the same distance. Letw be the
score vector for s, and let w′ be scoring vector for s′. From
the triangle inequality, d(w−w′, 0) = d((c′1, . . . , c
′
m), 0) ≤
r. We now examine the w˜(c′2 +w1 −w2, 0, c
′
3, c
′
4, . . . , c
′
m).
The first element has to be smaller than c′1, and since∑m
i=1 c
′
i = 0 , we now begin reducing c
′
4, . . . , c
′
m until we
create a= w˜′, such that its elements sum up to 0 as well.
Since every dimension in the new vector is less than before,
d(w˜′, 0) ≤ d(w − w′, 0) ≤ r, and w˜′ + w’s has a tie be-
tween c1 and c3. Proof of 1: Assume that there is a state
s = (s1, . . . , sm) in which there are c1, c2, c3 ∈ C such that
s1 ≥ s2 ≥ s3; and another state s′ within a distance r from s
where c2, c3 are tied. We construct a (non-normalized) vec-
tor s′′ where c1, c3 are tied, such that |s′′j − sj| ≤ |s
′
j − sj |
for all j (hence s′′ is closer to s than s′) or one where s′′ is
such that s′′j = s
′
j for j > 2 and |s
′′
1 − s1| ≤ |s
′
2 − s2| and
|s′′2 − s2| ≤ |s
′
1 − s1|.
W.l.o.g we have s′3 ≥ s3 and s
′
j ≤ sj for all j 6= 2, 3,.
Denote by w = s′2 = s
′
3 be the winning score in s
′. There
are several cases: (I) if w ≥ s1, define s
′′
1 = s1, s
′′
2 = s2 ≤
s′′1 , s
′′
3 = s1; (II) if s2 < w < s1, define s
′′
1 = w ∈ [s
′
1 +
1, s1], s
′′
2 = s2, s
′′
3 = w . It is easy to check that s
′′ holds
both conditions, thus d( s
′′
‖s′′‖ , s) ≤ d(s
′, s) ≤ r as required.
4This is a metric on a scoring vector, composed of a
singleton metric D : R2 → [0, 1], where d(s, s′) =
maxc∈C D(s(c), s
′(c)). This includes, for example, the ℓ∞ norm.
If (III) w ≤ s2, it quite simple to see that by setting s′′1 =
w, s′′2 = w − 1, s
′′
3 = w we are closer to s than s
′.
Proof of 2: any two candidates which are tied with the
score leader of s – c1 – at states at distance r from s are also
tied for the leadership in a state within the same distance r
from s. Since if there is any tie between candidates c′, c′′,
either one of them is c1, or both of them are tied with c1 in
the radius r (as the difference in the score of c1 in s and the
state where it isn’t tied for the victory is larger than when it
is tied for the win), all candidates which are tied with some
other candidate in radius r, are tied with c1, and hence “can
be tied with c1 in Sd,r(s)” is a transitive relation. Since any
candidate-wise metric is in particular neutral, Hd,r is up-
ward closed by the first part.
Let x be the lowest-ranked candidate participating in any
tie. By upward-closeness, (y, c1) ∈ Hd,r for all y ranked
weakly above x. Then by transitivity, any edge (y, z) where
y, z, are ranked weakly abovex is also inHd,r, which means
thatHd,r is a clique.
Proof of 2 is similar to Meir (2015), Lemma 2.
Theorem 13. Suppose agents each have a cliqued epistemic
model (not necessarily the same one). Iterative voting using
Plurality must converge to OD equilibrium, from any initial
state.
Proof. For contradiction, let us assume the theorem is
wrong and there is a cycle. That is, there is a sequence of
scoring vectors (states) s1, . . . sq such that sj+1 is the out-
come of an agent i making an OD move in sj , and s1 is the
result of an agent making an OD move in sq. Let B be the
set of candidates whose score changes throughout the cy-
cle, and let z ∈ B be the candidate with the lowest score in
the cycle (if there are multiple such candidates, let z be the
lowest ranked in the tie-breaking rule).
Let sq
′
was be a state where z is at their lowest score, and
in which an agent j makes a move, changing their vote from
some candidate a to z. This means z was undominated at
this point for j, which means all ties with B elements were
within the same information set, and moreover, z ≻j c and
c ≻j a for any c ∈ B (Since the pivot-graph is a clique,
there is a tie between each 2 candidates in B). However, as
this is a cycle, there is a step sq¯ , in which agent j changes
their vote from b ∈ B to a. This means b is dominated, and a
is not, but this means there is some tie between a and another
candidate x. Since c ≻j a for any c ∈ B, this means x /∈ B.
If in sq
′
x’s score was larger than z’s, this means there
was a tie between x and a was in the pivot-graph for agent
j, and by moving to z, this indicates x ≻j a. If x’s score
was smaller than z’s in sq
′
, the score of b in sq¯ is larger than
that of x (since all scores are larger than that of z in sq
′
),
and since b ≻j a, agent j should have preferred to stay with
agent b.
Theorem 14. Suppose agents each have a concentric,
cliqued epistemic model (not necessarily the same one). It-
erative voting under Veto must converge to OD equilibrium,
from any initial state.
Proof. Assume, for contradiction, that the process does
not converge. Let R be the set of candidates whose score
changes an infinite number of times, and let z ∈ R be the
candidate which has the lowest score in the cycle (breaking
ties using the tie-breaking rule), and let sq be the state where
it reaches this abysmal score. That is, some voter j moves
from vetoing candidate a to vetoing candidate z. Candidate
a’s (and any other c ∈ R) score is above z’s, as otherwise its
own vetoing before would give it a lower score than z. Since
this is a cliqued epistemic model, leaving a means it is the
favorite candidate of voter j over all candidates with scores
above z, in particular, for any c ∈ R, a ≻j c.
At some point in the future sq
′
, due to the cycle, voter
j will move from vetoing some candidate b ∈ C to veto
a, due to an edge in its relevant pivot-graph, indicating a tie
between a and some other candidate x. If x’s score at sq was
higher than z, then we know a is preferred over it from z’s
vetoing. If x’s score was lower, we know it hasn’t changed
(as it isn’t in R), meaning b is still tied with a as well in
the pivot-graph of sq
′
as it was in sq, hence voter j will not
move (since a ≻j b).
Other convergence results from
(Meir, Lev, and Rosenschein 2014) could be similarly
extended for any upward-closed information structure.
Theorem 14 with Prop. 12 imply the first non-plurality
result for local dominance.
Corollary 15. Using any candidate-wise metric, local-
dominance converges to an equilibrium when using veto.
Discussion and Future Directions
This paper presents a framework to model voting situations
in which voters do not have perfect information of the world.
Moreover, they do not even have an exact understanding of
their uncertainty of the world’s state. Hence, their under-
standing is modeled in a coarser way – as “shades of likeli-
hood” of various voting outcomes, derived from a prospec-
tive poll. This framework is robust enough so as to allow us
to capture many previously suggested heuristics and strate-
gies of voter behavior under uncertainty. That is, we are able
to express these heuristics as rational strategies under partic-
ular information structure known to players.
Indeed, the use of the pivot-graph and its topological
properties to show convergence (or lack of it), opens the
question of whether we can discuss issues of convergence
in terms of graph structures (and the metrics or proper-
ties that induce them). The fact that ordinal dominance in
a large population voting scenario can be computed effi-
ciently, stands in contrast to the negative results in Conitzer
et al. (2011), where verifying whether vote a′ dominates a
is NP-hard under the Borda rule. This is due to our simpli-
fying assumption on the sharp pivot property that allows us
to replace (arbitrarily complicated) information sets with a
simple pivot graph representation.
A natural and important use of our model is to reformulate
heuristics from various game-theoretic domains – not lim-
ited to social choice – as ordinally-dominant strategies. This
might offer an insight into the built-in assumptions inher-
ent in these heuristics, and allowing, perhaps, novel formu-
lations of new heuristics and methods, tailored to particular
uncertainty structures.
Another promising direction is exploring possible con-
nections between ordinal information structures and existing
theories of qualitative uncertainty such as (Halpern 1997).
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